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INTRODUCTION
Joseph Goeckeritz (Goeckeritz) challenges the practices of his prior
employer, Newspaper Agency Company (NAC). Goeckeritz had worked for
sixteen years delivering papers for NAC. NAC took advantage of paper carriers
like Goeckeritz, stealing their tips and labeling carriers as independent contractors
to further steal from their pay through deductions for supplies, complaints, and
property damage. The lower court dismissed his claims, finding Goeckeritz was
not the aggrieved party when NAC stole his tips, and further finding carriers were
properly classified as contractors. The lower court erred in its ruling on both counts
and Goeckeritz requests the Court reverse summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
NAC had no right to insert itself into the process by which customers directly
tipped carriers, and then withhold the tips from the intended beneficiaries.
NAC withheld tips intended for carriers on "down routes". A "down route"
did not have an assigned carrier with a signed "Independent Contractor
Agreement" (Agreement). R at 681-700. NAC retained the tips it received from
"down route" customers, even though customers intended the tips for paper
carriers.Rat 833-35. NAC has no basis for withholding tips clearly intended for
paper carriers and should be required to disgorge the tips.
8
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I.

NAC breached the contract by retaining tips.

A.

Goeckeritz sufficiently alleged a breach of oral contract claim based on
NAC's retention of tips.

~

NAC argues Goeckeritz has not properly alleged a breach of oral contract
claim resulting from NAC withholding of tips. NAC did not argue failure to plead
an oral contract on summary judgment, suggesting NAC understood a breach of
oral contract claim was included in the pleadings. R at 940-41. Regardless,
<@

Goeckeritz has satisfied the low notice-pleading requirement for a breach of
contract claim by alleging the nature and basis of his breach of contract claim. Am.
W Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 342 P.3d 224,230 (Utah Sup.Ct. 2014).

Goeckeritz alleged a breach of contract claim against NAC based on NAC's
failure to forward Goeckeritz his tips pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. R at
2. Goeckeritz alleged NAC only withheld tips from "down routes" - routes without
a written Agreement. R at 17. Goeckeritz could only claim these tips pursuant to an
oral agreement, one based on the same terms as the written Agreement. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (allows the Court to draw
~

reasonable inferences). The allegations are sufficient to put NAC on notice that
Goeckeritz was claiming a breach of an oral contract (or oral modification of the
written agreement).
9
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NAC's complaints the complaint lacks the term "oral contract". However,
there is no requirement that a plaintiff plead specific language in order to maintain
a claim. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Under Utah's liberal notice pleading, a plaintiff is
only required to submit a "'short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief and 'a demand for judgment for the relief.' The plaintiff must
only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved."' Canfield v. Layton
City, 122 P.3d 622, 625 (Utah Sup.Ct. 2005). Goeckeritz's short and plain

statement showed he was entitled to relief for the wrongfully withheld tips and
satisfies the pleading standard.
NAC cites to Fortress Financial and Pension Services, Inc. v. Watkins to
support failure to specifically plead an oral contract will limit a party's recovery to
a written contract. 2003 UT App 400. However, Fortress Financial addressed
different circumstances from the ones present in this case. Id. In Fortress
Financial, the defendant admitted liability as to a contract outlined in a specific

paragraph of the complaint, which detailed a signed agreement. Id at <J[ 2. The
award of damages, however, included those arising from the breach of an oral
contract. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals overturned the ruling, finding the lower
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~

court "should have limited its ruling to a determination of damages arising from
the admitted breach of the written contracts". Id at <JI 7.
Notably, Goeckeritz's complaint does not specifically allege the breach of a
written contract. (Rat 22-24). The complaint purposefully states "breach of
contract" to avoid any limitation as to a written or oral contract because both types
of contract are addressed. Id. Furthermore, the other allegations rely on an oral
contract. See Rat 2,4,5. Fortress Financial is not applicable.
On similar grounds, NAC argues Goeckeritz failed to allege a breach based
on NAC's retention of tips. However, this was specifically alleged in the
complaint: "NAC has breached the contract. .. by failing to forward to newspaper
carriers all tips received by NAC from Newspaper subscribers.Rat 2. (Emphasis
added). NAC complains that this allegation was included in the introduction but
~

not the section specifically entitled "Breach of Contract". NAC's complaints are
unavailing as the "Breach of Contract" section incorporates all preceding
paragraphs, including the introductory paragraph. R at 22.
NAC cites to Exxon Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gasprom, a Ninth Circuit case, to
suggest breach for failure to forward tips was not properly alleged. 462. Fed. Appx.

0J)

737, 738 (9 th Cir. 2011). In Exxon Mobil Oil Corp., the court dismissed a breach of
contract counterclaim included in the introductory paragraph because the
~

11
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counterclaim consisted of a single sentence and was insufficient to put the plaintiff
on notice as to the nature and basis of the claim. Id at 738 "This single sentence,
buried at the end of an introductory paragraph, was insufficient to put ExxonMobil
on notice." It was the lack of detail, rather than the introductory location of the
claims, that resulted in dismissal. Id. Though partially included in the introduction,
Goeckeritz sufficiently alleged NAC breached the contract by withholding tips.
B.

There is evidence of an oral contract addressing tips.
NAC claims it never agreed to forward tips to Goeckeritz on "down routes",

which it further argues constitutes a lack of evidence that tips were ever included
as part of the contract. Goeckeritz believed he was entitled to tips because he never
negotiated away his right. If the term was not specifically addressed by the parties
then the term is considered ambiguous and the court steps in to resolve the
ambiguity. Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P.3d 428,432 (Utah Sup.Ct. 2006).
The pattern and practice between Goeckeritz and NAC shows that the parties
performed "down routes" pursuant to the same terms as a contracted route. To the
extent the term was not agreed to by the parties, this pattern, along with
Goeckeritz's admitted entitlement to tips received directly from customers on
"down routes", serves to resolve the ambiguous term in Goeckeritz's favor.
Gillmor v. Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 65 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
12
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More poignantly, there is evidence that NAC agreed to forward tips on
"down routes" as NAC previously forwarded to Goeckeritz tips from a route
performed pursuant to an oral contract. Goeckeritz signed his last Agreement with
~

NAC in April, 2012. Rat 781. The Agreement expired on April 2nd , 2014. Rat
784. NAC allowed Goeckeritz to continue to service his route without a signed
Agreement from April 2nd , 2014, through Late-May 2015, during which Goeckeritz
and NAC were operating pursuant to an oral agreement.Rat 774. However, NAC
continued to forward to Goeckeritz tips received from this route, even though it
was only governed pursuant to an oral agreement. See Rat 837-845 (NAC
forwarded tips to Goeckeritz received on 4/01/15; 4/02/15; 4/05/15; 4/08/15;
5/13/15; 5/19/15; and 5/21/15). These tips are evidence that Goeckeritz was owed
tips pursuant to all his oral contracts.

II.

NAC converted Goeckeritz's tips

A.

Goeckeritz is entitled to his tips because Goeckeritz was contractually owed
the tips, if Goeckeritz is an employee he is statutorily entitled to the tips, and
customers intended Goeckeritz to receive the tips.
NAC argues Goeckeritz was not entitled to the tips, claiming it eliminated

Goeckeritz's right through the repetition of its unlawful practice of withholding
~

tips. However, if the practice of withholding tips was unlawful to begin with the
practice cannot be made lawful simply through its repetition. Teran v. GB Int'l,
01
13
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S.P.A., 652 F. App'x 660, 668 n.7 (10th Cir. 2016) ("a party cannot benefit from
his own wrongdoing"). If Goeckeritz had a contractual right to the tip, NAC cannot

~

waive Goeckeritz's right simply be repeatedly violating the contract because
waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of the right. See Webb v. R. O.A.
Gen., Inc., 773 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Similarly, if Goeckeritz was

statutorily entitled to his tips as an employee, NAC could not revoke the statutory
protections afforded employees simply by continuously violating the law. Id; Utah
Admin. Code R 610-1-4. Without Goeckeritz's intentional relinquishment, he is
still entitled to the tip no matter how long NAC repeated its practice.
Even if Goeckeritz was not contractually or statutorily entitled the tips,
Goeckeritz should still have received his tips because it was the customer's intent
to tip Goeckeritz, not NAC. Whether the customer knew Goeckeritz was his carrier
is irrelevant, the customer intended that the tip be forwarded to the person (or
persons) delivering the paper. The customer's intent is evidenced by customers
tipping Goeckeritz directly, as well as the societal understanding that tips are

~

intended for the workers, not for the business. R at 780-791; 681-700; 767. The
customer's intent rules regardless of NAC's pattern of withholding tips. See Boyle
v. Dinsdale, 143 P. 136, 137 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1914) (discussing entitlement to a gift

where gift was delivered to trustee [like NAC] and intent of donor was clear).
14
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Because the tips were intended for carriers like Goeckeritz, Goeckeritz is entitled
to the tips.
B.

NAC wrongfully obtained tips by representing the tips would be forwarded
to paper carriers.
NAC argues it did not wrongfully obtain the tips because NAC, the business,

is the paper carrier on the route. To start, there is a societal understanding that tips
()

VJf9

are intended for workers, not for the business. See Utah Admin. Code R 610-1-4.

1

In its solicitations, NAC does not clarify NAC would retain some of the tips. R at
Q

683. NAC's failure to notify customers that some tips would be retained by NAC
constitutes NAC wrongfully obtaining the tips. See Christensen v. Pugh, 36 P.2d
100, 101 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1934) (conversion by misrepresentation).
Furthermore, NAC has not explained why it should be considered the carrier
on a "down route". R at 685. There is nothing that distinguishes NAC 's role in
"down routes" from its role in contracted routes. On contracted routes, NAC
contracts with Goeckeritz to deliver the paper and Goeckeritz is entitled to all tips.

GJ

On "down routes", NAC once again contracts with Goeckeritz to deliver the paper,
but Goeckeritz is not entitled to tips because NAC, for some reason, is now the

Gt)

paper carrier. The position is further contradicted by Goeckeritz's admitted
entitlement to tips received in person from "down route" customers. NAC is not
1

NAC's retention of tips is unlawful as to NAC's employees because withholding tips from employees violates
Utah Admin. Code R 610-1-4. Rat 684.

15
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the carrier on contracted routes and should not be considered the carrier on "down
routes".
Alternatively, NAC argues that it was not wrongful to retain tips because it
could not determine the intended beneficiary of the tip. NAC cites to no case where

~

this argument was presented as a successful defense to conversion. If NAC could
not accurately determine the carrier for whom the tip was intended, it never should
have solicited tips. But the intended beneficiary has never been a concern for NAC
who, on contracted routes, simply forwards the tips to the current contracted
~

carrier, regardless of whether the carrier had just started and had not delivered a
paper yet. This concern for the proper beneficiary is just another stated
justification for NAC to retain what has become a significant, but wrongfully
obtained, sum of money.

III.

As an alternative basis for recovery, Goeckeritz alleged NAC has
benefited from unjust enrichment through retention of tips.

A.

Goeckeritz has plead unjust enrichment as an alternative theory of recovery
and, to the extent it is determined there was no oral agreement governing
"down routes", Goeckeritz would have no adequate remedy of law.
Goeckeritz plead unjust enrichment as an alternative theory of recovery in

case there was no agreement governing "down routes". Unjust enrichment is an
equitable remedy available if there is no adequate remedy at law. Thorpe v. Wash.

City, 243 P.3d 500, 507 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). Since a contract can constitute an
16
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adequate remedy at law, NAC points to Goeckeritz's allegations of a contract
governing "down routes" as a basis for dismissal. Id. There is a question, however,
as to whether there was a meeting of the minds on Goeckeritz's compensation for

J

"down routes", specifically the allocation of tips. If there was no contract,
Goeckeritz could state an unjust enrichment claim because he would have no
adequate remedy at law. In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 751 F.
Supp. 2d 183, 192 (D. Me. 2010) ("plaintiff is not precluded from pleading both
theories because a factfinder may find that no contract exists").

lttJ
B.

NAC's should not be allowed to escape liability for its failure to maintain
records of which carriers performed "down routes".
To prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, Goeckeritz must establish that he

provided some benefit to NAC. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 240 P.3d 754, 763 (Utah
Sup.Ct. 2010). Goeckeritz provided an indirect benefit to NAC via superior service
to NAC's customers that resulted in a customer tip. See Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L
Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83. Relying on its own failure to retain records, NAC argues

Goeckeritz has not established an indirect benefit because he cannot point to a
specific tip that was submitted to NAC based off a "down route" serviced by

J

Goeckeritz. But NAC cannot avoid liability for its own failure to retain records.
To the extent NAC maintained records, Goeckeritz has established that his
service resulted in regular tips.Rat 837-845. Goeckeritz will be able to estimate,
17
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based on past received tips, an amount of tips NAC received from "down routes.
The reason Goeckeritz cannot present a specific amount of tips withheld is NAC
elected not to retain records of which carriers serviced "down routes", ostensibly
obfuscating which carriers worked the route and would be entitled to the tips. R at
767. NAC should not be allowed to avoid liability and retain the benefit of its
wrongdoing, as dismissal due to poor record keeping "does nothing more than
encourage defendants not to keep records, shielding themselves from liability.

Salam v. Lifewatch, Inc., No. 13 CV 9305, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193553, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sep. 6, 2016); Mullins v. Direct Dig., Ltd. Liab. Co., 795 F.3d 654, 668
(7th Cir. 2015).
C.

2

Goeckeritz had an expectation to tips.
Goeckeritz delivered papers with the hope that appreciative customers would

provide him with a tip. NAC attempts to argue that it would not be equitable for
Goeckeritz to receive tips intended for him because he performed his services
without the expectation of receiving tips. Howard v. Manes, 309 P.3d 279, 289
(Utah Ct. App. 2013). As support, NAC argues that Goeckeritz was never told he
would be allowed to retain tips. However, Goeckeritz retained "down route" tips
received in person and NAC continued to forward Goeckeritz tips from his regular
2

Of note, Goeckeritz has brought his tip claims on behalf of a class. To the extent the Court is concerned about
determining the correct beneficiaries of the retained tips, proceeding under a class al1ows for the equal division of
tips amongst the paper carriers who delivered "down routes" over the respective period of time.

18
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route, even when Goeckeritz was performing the route pursuant to an oral
agreement. There was no reason for Goeckeritz to expect he was not entitled to
tips.
GOECKERITZ SHOULD BE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS AN
EMPLOYEE RATHER THAN AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

I.

The Employment Security Act was preserved and should be considered
in determining Goeckeritz's proper classification.
Goeckeritz relied on the two-part Employment Security Act (Act) test to

argue for employee classification. See Utah Code§ 35A-4-101. NAC has objected
to the Act test, arguing this analysis was not preserved by Goeckeritz in the lower
court and there is no basis for using the test where unemployment benefits are not
at issue. Goeckeritz did, as NAC concedes, preserve this analysis on oral argument.
Appellee Brief, pg 14. Furthermore, the Act should be considered outside of the
(J

unemployment compensation context because failure to consider the Act can result
in inconsistent results where a worker is an employee in one context but not an
employee in another context. The act incorporates the traditional control test but is
more fleshed-out, so there is no reason for the court to not consider, if not adopt,
the Act's test for the purposes of proper classification.
Though preserved on oral argument, NAC argues that by failing to brief the
Act that the argument is considered waived. Arguments raised on oral argument
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are considered preserved. See Commonwealth v. McMillan, 376 Pa. Super. 25, 39
n.7, 545 A.2d 301,308 (1988). Goeckeritz's failure to brief the Act on summary
judgment does not revoke his subsequent preservation.
In addition to being preserved, analyzing Goeckeritz's classification through
the Act test makes sense because it results in consistency in terms of the
classification of employees and presents a fleshed-out traditional control test. The

Gv

Act inherently governs unemployment insurance for employees. Utah Code § 35A4-l 02. If the courts were to apply the Act test only to cases involving
unemployment insurance, it could lead to inconsistent results. For example, a
scenario would be possible where a worker is classified as an employee for the
~

purposes of unemployment compensation but is classified as an independent
contractor for all other purposes. By implementing, or at least considering, the Act
test as the basis for classification analysis will eliminate the possibility for
inconsistency.
An additional benefit of relying on the Act is that the test is a better fleshedout version of the traditional control test applied by Utah courts in the past. The
control tests used by Utah courts in the past have considered various factors, and

~

the relevant factors have changed from appeal to appeal See Tasters, Ltd. v. Dep 't
of Emp't Sec., 863 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Mitchell v. Rice, 885 P.2d 820,
20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

821 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). With the "gig economy" creating a new class of workers
there is even more uncertainty regarding proper classification, and both employers
and workers would benefit from an establish test with multiple factors for

J

consideration. The Act has such a test, with incorporates the traditional control test
and benefits from the Utah Labor Commission's involvement, including the
promulgation of Utah Admin Code R994-204-303 which specifically identifies
fifteen factors for determining a worker's proper classification. Furthermore, the
case law reviewing the Act is significantly more developed than the traditional

lJ
control test, as Utah Labor Commission rulings are more frequently presented to
the Court of Appeals than the circumstances present in this case.
NAC argues the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v.
Manning declined to apply the Act test in a similar context. 985 P.2d 243, 248

(Utah Sup.Ct. 1999). The plaintiff argued in Utah Home Fire Ins. that despite
failing the control test, a worker should still be classified as an independent
contractor because he fell within an exception in the Act. Id at 248. Utah Supreme
Court declined to apply the employee exception outside of the Act's context. Id.
The case is distinguishable because in Utah Home Fire Ins., the plaintiff tried to
overturn the control test through the Act, whereas Goeckeritz attempts to
supplement the traditional control test through the Act.
21
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Considering or adopting the Act's test as the de facto test for employee
classification will reduce inconsistency and better educate employers and workers
on their respective rights. As such, the Court should consider the Act in
determining Goeckeritz's correct classification.

II.

Under the Employment Security Act, Goeckeritz should be classified as
an employee because he was not engaged in an independently
established trade.

Under the Act test, a worker is considered an employee if he is not engaged
in an independently established trade. Utah Code § 35A-4-204(3)(a). The Act
spells out seven factors. Most factors show Goeckeritz was not engaged in an
independent trade and therefore should be classified as an employee.
A. Separate place of business

Goeckeritz was required to pick up papers at NAC's depo and assemble
papers at NAC's depo for his supervisor's review.Rat 691-93; 820-21. NAC

~

argues this factor does not support employee classification because Goeckeritz
would occasionally assemble papers in his vehicle if they fell apart during travel.

~

Occasionally assembling papers in his car, which NAC claimed was not even
required, does not constitute a separate place of business.
For the factor to support independent contractor classification, the worker
must be allowed to perform their work at a separate location of their choosing.
~
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Needle Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 372 P.3d 696, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 2016).

J

Carriers could not negotiate pick up their papers from a NAC depo. Rat 691-93.
Coupled with NAC's right to supervise its carriers and review assembled

J

newspapers before delivery, this factor supports employee classification.

B. Substantial Investment in Tools and Equipment
Substantial investment is determined by weighing the worker's investment
in equipment against the employer's investment in equipment. Needle Inc., 372
P.3d at 702. NAC argues the factor does not allow the Court to weigh the relevant
investment, but the Court of Appeals has interpreted the factor as requiring a
comparison between the respective investments. Id.
Goeckeritz had no real investment in paper delivery. He had a vehicle, but
that vehicle was not purchased for paper delivery.Rat 187. NAC made Goeckeritz

iJ

pay for supplies, including polybags, maps, pencils, and rubber bands, but
Goeckeritz could come into work without any tools and everything would be
provided to him by NAC, even a vehicle.Rat 744-46.
On the other hand, NAC has a significant investment in paper delivery. NAC
built a depo for paper carriers to pick up newspaper and assemble newspapers. R at
774, <JI 35; Rat 803-812. NAC purchased polybags, maps, pencils, and rubber
bands for its carriers. NAC maintained a customer service system and delivery
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software for its carriers. Id. NAC claims Goeckeritz did not need to use these
systems but the systems were essential to paper delivery. Without these systems,
carriers would not know when new customers were added or dropped from a route
and what accommodations had been granted regarding paper delivery.Rat 720.
NAC's investment in paper delivery far outweighs Goeckeritz's investment.
C. Other clients
This factor looks at whether a worker's trade is entirely dependent on a
single client. A single client suggests the trade is not independently established.
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(a); see also Leach v. Board of Review of

Indus. Comm'n, 260 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah 1953). NAC argues Goeckeritz could
~

work for other employer but that analysis is irrelevant to this factor. See Fuller

Brush Co. v. Indus. Comm 'n, 104 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1940); Leach, 260
P.2d at 748. For a worker to be an independent contractor, the '"business' or
'trade' must be established independent of the employer." Goeckeritz's paper
delivery "business" was entirely reliant on NAC.

~

D. Profit or Loss
An independent contractor can realize a profit or loss. Utah Admin. Code §
994-204-303(1)(b)(iv). NAC argues gas prices, vehicle maintenance, insurance
premiums, and liability for property damage created a real risk for loss. However,
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~

these risks are no different from those faced by employees. Most employees drive
to work and have to pay gas prices, vehicle maintenance, insurance premiums, and
are liable for property damage. These general risks that are present for all workers

J

are not the type of risks that would convert an employee to an independent
contractor.
E. Advertising
Independent contractors advertise their services. Utah Admin. Code § 994204-303( 1)(b )( v). NAC argues Goeckeritz could have advertised his services
online. But the question is not whether he could have advertised, but whether he

did advertise his services. Goeckeritz did not engage in any advertising, and was
forbidden by NAC from advertising during paper delivery. Appellee Brief, pg 35.

F. Licenses
If a business requires business, trade, or professional licenses, that further

suggests that the business is of a type generally considered an independently
established trade. Utah Admin. Code§ 994-204-303(1)(b)(vi). There are no
licenses required for a carrier to deliver newspapers. The lack of licensing suggests
paper delivery is not the type of business that is conducive to independent
contractors.
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G. Business records and tax forms
The burden is on the employer to show that "[t]he worker maintains records
or documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so
he or she may file self-employment and other business tax forms with the [IRS]
and other agencies." Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(vii); Needle Inc. 372
P.3d at 708. NAC provided Goeckeritz with 1099s. The issuance of a 1099,
however, is not determinative where Goeckeritz "did not elect to receive a 1099
rather than a W-2 and there is no other evidence of documentation, record
maintenance, or filings consistent with the operation of an independent business."

Id. Goeckeritz did not elect to receive a 1099. This factor therefore does not
support either classification because there is no evidence, other than the 1099, to
establish Goeckeritz maintained his own business documents.

III.

Under the Act, Goeckeritz should be classified as an employee because
he was not free of NA C's control.

If NAC has established Goeckeritz was engaged in an independently
established trade, the Court then considers whether Goeckeritz was free of NAC's
control. Utah Admin. Code§ 994-204-303(1). The Utah Administrative Code
names eight factors. These factors show Goeckeritz was not free ofNAC's control
and must be classified as an employee.
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A. Compliance with Instructions

Employers have the right to require compliance with instructions from
employees. NAC argues it did not have this right because the Agreement states
Goeckeritz would not be subject to NAC's control. However, "[i]n determining
whether a relationship is an [employee/independent contractor] the actual status of
the persons rather than the contract entered into between them will determine that
question." Salt Lake Transp. Co. v. Bd. of Review, 296 P.2d 983, 984 (Sup.Ct.
1956). Despite the Agreement, NAC exerted control over its carriers through
deductions, supervision, and audits.Rat 736-738, 775; 777 820-821; 830-833. If a
customer or an advertiser wanted NAC to perform something in a particular way,
NAC would order carriers to comply. If a carrier did not comply and a customer
complained, NAC would deduct from the carrier's compensation.Rat 837-45.
Through deductions, NAC exerted control over its carriers.
B. Training

Training suggests control. Over the past few years, NAC has trained new
carriers on paper assembly and delivery. 3 Because Goeckeritz himself did not

3

NAC claims the allegation of training provided to carriers is false. NAC's own vice president admitted managers
take new carriers for ride-alongs, which supports Goeckeritz's testimony that he witnessed NAC managers
providing new carriers training that lasted from days to weeks. R at 697, 726-27, 731-35.
NAC further claims that because paper delivery is simple, training was not necessary. This does not defeat the fact
that Goeckeritz observed training at the depo. That NAC would train carriers even though the task was simple is
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receive training, NAC argues that the factor is not applicable in this case.
However, whether or not Goeckeritz received training, NAC's practice of training
new carriers suggests that NAC exerts control over the manner and mode by which
carriers will perform their duties (i.e pursuant to training). NAC still exerts control
over carriers even though it did not train Goeckeritz.
C. Pace or Order Requirement
Goeckeritz was required to deliver some papers to customers in specific
order and/or prior to the agreed to deadline for paper delivery as part of NAC's
accommodations to customers. R at 803-814. Through these accommodations,
NAC exerted control over the order and pace by which Goeckeritz delivered
papers. NAC would also exert control over the pace and order of paper assembly,
requiring carriers to arrive at the depo on specific days and times to assemble
papers prior to major holidays.Rat 816-820; 824-25.
NAC once again argues that Goeckeritz was not required to abide by NAC's
orders. However, if Goeckeritz failed to abide by NAC's requirements, NAC
would deduct from Goeckeritz's compensation. Through the deductions, NAC
could and did dictate the order and pace of Goeckeritz's work.

further evidence that the training was intended as a means of controlling the way by which carriers performed their
obligations.
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D. Work performed on employer's premises
Goeckeritz was required to pick-up papers and assemble papers at NAC's
depo. Though Goeckeritz did, on occasion, fix disassembled papers in his car

J

during paper delivery this did not waive the requirement that Goeckeritz assemble
papers at the depo.
E. Personal Service
Though Goeckeritz's family occasionally helped Goeckeritz to deliver
papers, NAC retained the right to control Goeckeritz's substitutes. NAC could and
did refuse to allow certain paper carriers to serve as a substitute for Goeckeritz. R
at 701-759 (170:21-173:21); Rat 773 <Jrcl[ 24, 25. NAC would also pull routes from

()
l.fiJ)

substitutes if that substitute did a poor job. Id. NAC's control over Goeckeritz's
ability to subcontract suggests Goeckeritz is an employee. See Utah Home Fire

O

Ins. Co., 985 P.2d at 247; Tasters, Ltd. 863 P.2d at 21-22.
F. Continuous Relationship

~

NAC admits this element supports employee classification.
G. Set hours of work
"The establishment of set hours or a specific number of hours of work by the
employer indicates control". Utah Admin. Code § 994-204-303. NAC established
set hours for Goeckeritz to work: between 1:30 (the time the depo opened) and 6
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am/ 7am on Sunday (the deadline for delivering papers). Rat 781-791. NAC
argues the timeframe does not support employee classification because it reflects
the realities of paper delivery. But if paper delivery requires set hours of work, that
is just evidence that paper delivery is not conducive to being performed by an
independent contractor.
H. Method of Payment
This factor considers whether the payment was in wages or fees as compared
to a payment for a complete job. Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 332 P.3d 922,
933 (Utah Sup.Ct. 2014). Employees get paid in regular amounts at stated intervals
whereas independent contractors are typically paid a fixed sum on a by-the-job
basis. Tasters, Ltd., 863 P.2d at 28. NAC argues biweekly compensation was more
convenient for NAC, but that does not excuse NAC's representation in
advertisements of biweekly compensation nor the fact that Goeckeritz's
compensation mirrors employee compensation rather than independent contractor
compensation (biweekly checks of a similar amount for 15 years). Rat 777, 82324,839-842.
This element also supports employee classification if NAC determines the
method of payments. Utah Admin. Code § 994-204-303(2)(b )(viii). NAC
determined it would pay Goeckeritz biweekly compensation because it was
30
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convenient for NAC. R at 781-91.Goeckeritz was also unable to negotiate the

iJ

terms of his payment, as he was told NAC will just negotiate with another carrier.
Rat 724-25. NAC's ability to dictate the terms of compensation also support

J

employee classification.
IV.

Under the traditional control test, Goeckeritz should be classified as an
employee because he was not free of NAC's control

NAC argues that the Court should apply a traditional right-to-control test in
determining Goeckeritz's proper classification. NAC claims the factors support

J

independent contractor classification, citing to a four-factor test enumerated by the
Utah Supreme Court in Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316,318
(Utah 1975). In Harry L. Young, the Utah Supreme Court considered the following
factors in determining proper classification: (1) whatever covenants or agreements
exist concerning the right of direction and control over the employee, whether
express or implied; (2) the right to hire and fire; (3) the method of payment, i.e.,
whether in wages or fees, as compared to payment for a complete job or project;
and (4) the furnishing of the equipment. Id. However, even under the traditional
test, Goeckeritz should still be classified as an employee.
A. Right to Control

Despite the terms in the Agreement, NAC had the right to control most

J

aspects of Goeckeritz's performance. It is the substance of the relationship, rather
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than the contracted terms, that are key to the independent contractor/employee
analysis. Salt La,ke Transp. Co., 296 P.2d at 984. NAC controlled Goeckeritz,
suggesting Goeckeritz should have been classified as an employee.
Goeckeritz was required to arrive at the Depo between 1:30 am and 4:30 am
to pick-up and assemble newspapers at his station within the NAC Depo. R at 78191. For the Sunday paper, Goeckeritz was required to assemble papers at the Depo
on Saturday. Id. Additionally, Goeckeritz was required to prepare papers at the
Depo the day before certain holidays.Rat 816-819, 701-759. In preparation for
Thanksgiving delivery, NAC required Goeckeritz to assemble the paper at the
Depo on Wednesday even though Goeckeritz could have easily prepared the paper
on Thursday. Id. If the papers were late, Goeckeritz was required to be on call and
to arrive at the depo for assembly once the papers arrived. R at 703-4. NAC had
the right to dictate the time Goeckeritz needed to be at the depo for assembly.

~

NAC also dictated the assembly of the newspapers. Goeckeritz would
receive special advertisements to be included in the newspaper. R at 820-821, 832833. NAC would provide insert instructions with explanations, provided by
advertisers, on where to place the insert in the newspaper. Id. Once assembled,
NAC managers would review the paper for proper assembly. Id, Rat 775.
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~

NAC further controlled the when, where, and how of paper delivery. NAC

~

dictated the specific delivery location, requiring that papers: be delivered to the
upper portion of the driveway, that placement be consistent, that delivery be at the

J

same time each day, that papers are not delivered on the sidewalk, and, where
available, delivery to paper tubes.Rat 813-14. Goeckeritz also had to abide by
customer accommodations granted by NAC, such as: porch delivery, door delivery,
steps delivery, ring the doorbell before delivery, bag all papers, delivery by a
certain time before the 6:00 am deadline, only use the sidewalk (not the driveway)
when approaching the house for delivery, no wrinkly bags, and delivering the
paper in a flower pot, among other accommodations.Rat 775, 802-814; 825-26;
701-759 (65:25 - 67:7). NAC also audited routes to make sure carriers were
complying with NAC's instructions. Rat 775, 830-31.
Though NAC did not evoke its right to dictate the time, place, and manner of
every delivery, the ability of NAC to dictate the details of paper delivery for some
customers establishes the baseline for NAC's right to control. Hunte v. Blumenthal,
680 A.2d 1231, 1236 (Conn 1996). ("Furthermore, it is immaterial that the
department may not, at all times, exercise the full extent of its power. An
employer-employee relationship does not depend upon the actual exercise of the
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right to control. The right to control is sufficient.") (emphasis added, citations
omitted).
NAC had the right to control every aspect of Goeckeritz's employment.
NAC even provided training to newspaper carriers regarding delivery, and the
delivery list4 provided to carriers had step-by-step instructions on how to drive
from one house to another ("From Depot, Right on 9400 South. Left on 500 West,
Right on 9800 South ... ). R at 271-282. This factor supports Goeckeritz's
classification as an employee.
NAC argues it did not have the right to control and that all it was dictating
was the end result of Goeckeritz 's obligations under the Agreement. The end result
was to assemble and deliver the newspaper, everything else was the means and
modes by which Goeckeritz performed his obligations. NAC left almost nothing to
Goeckeritz's discretion. By controlling all aspects of assembly and delivery, NAC
far exceeded dictating the end result of the contract.
NAC also argues that the control it exerted was necessary and inherent in
paper delivery. However, NAC cites no case where an employer exercised
significant control of a worker but that control was excused due to the nature of the
4

Though Goeckeritz elected not to follow the sequence shown on the delivery list, Goeckeritz would face discipline
for not following the sequence on those occasions where his managers discovered his deviation. Carriers were
further required to contact their district manager to change the sequence indicated on the Delivery List. The Delivery
List constitutes some control on the part ofNAC as it demonstrates NAC's attempt to influence paper carrier's
performance of their routes.
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work. Indeed, that NAC was required to exert significant control over its worker
suggests that paper delivery is not conducive to being done by a contractor. This
can be seen by NAC's reliance on employees to perform paper delivery. 5 NAC has
no excuse for the control it exerts over carriers, and this significant factor weighs
in favor of employee classification.
B. The Right to Hire and Fire

There are two elements that compose the right to hire and fire: ( 1) whether

iJ

Goeckeritz had the ability to subcontract his work; and (2) whether NAC had the
ability to discharge Goeckeritz at any time or whether Goeckeritz was immune to
discharge so long as he produced pursuant to the Agreement. Goeckeritz had the
ability to subcontract his work, though this ability was not free and clear of NAC
influence. Regarding the right to fire, though NAC was required pursuant to the
Agreement to provide thirty-day notice of termination or could terminate the
Agreement for material breach, NAC could also terminate employment without
cause by choosing to not renew an Agreement. NAC terminated Goeckeritz
without cause simply because Goeckeritz would not agree to independent
contractor classification.Rat 774, <JI 33; Rat 701-759 (14:18-21, 175:16-23). Wells
5

NAC argues that there is a distinction between carriers classified as contractors and employees that delivered
newspapers, claiming that contractors solely delivered papers but employees periodically delivered the paper. This
argument ignores assistant district manages, who are NAC employees but whose responsibility was primarily paper
delivery. R at 700. There is no distinction between assistant district managers and carriers other than one is an
employee and the other is classified as a contractor.
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v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1006,1020 (E.D. Mo. 2013). Both
elements support employee classification.
Goeckeritz previously addressed the right to hire subcontractors. Though
Goeckeritz could use subcontractors, the right was not free ofNAC's control. NAC
exercised the right to screen carriers and even prevented Goeckeritz from using
specific carriers as a substitute. In Utah Home Fire Ins. Co, the Utah Supreme
Court found similar limitations on the right to subcontract supported employee
classification. See Utah Home Fire Ins. Co 985 P.2d at 247. The factor supports
employee classification.
The second element is NAC's ability to fire Goeckeritz. If NAC, despite
Goeckeritz satisfying the contractual obligations, can fire Goeckeritz at will this
element suggests employee classification. Tasters, Ltd., 863 P.2d at 21-22.
Goeckeritz was terminated without cause or notice despite having an oral
agreement to service his routes. NAC could terminate carriers at will through its
right to decline to re-sign a carrier after an Agreement had expired. Missouri and
California courts have found a similar employer's right to terminate FedEx drivers
without cause suggested "at will" employment. See Wells, 979 F. Supp. 2d at
1020.; Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App.
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~

2007). NAC termination of Goeckeritz without cause suggests Goeckeritz was an

vi

employee. Id.
C. Wage or Per-Job Compensation
As addressed earlier, the resemblance of Goeckeritz's compensation to a
wage rather than per-job compensation, coupled with NAC's dictation of the terms
of compensations, support Goeckeritz' s classification as an employee.

D. Goeckeritz used NA C's equipment
As addressed earlier, Goeckeritz's investment was minimal and significantly
overshadowed by ANC's investment in the depo and software. As such, Goeckeritz
should not be classified as an independent contractor.
~

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Goeckeritz requests that the Court reverse

J

dismissal of his claims and allow Goeckeritz to pursue his claims and class claims
based on independent contractor misclassification and NAC's unlawful retention of
tips.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2018.
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Daniel Baczynski
AYRES LAW FIRM
Attorney for Appellant
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